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Abstract: China's A-shares family listed companies are facing a period of high intergenerational succession. This 
has attracted the attention and research of many scholars. The existing studies mainly focus on the motives, 
methods, and influencing factors of family business' intergenerational succession, and there are few studies 
involving the reaction of the capital markets. This article takes 45 listed family businesses as samples and uses the 
synthetic control method to examine the impact and the degree of influence that intergenerational succession has 
on stock price movements. Thereafter, a difference-in-differences estimation is conducted to test for robustness. 
At the conclusion of our research, we find that intergenerational succession has a significant negative effect on the 
stock price of listed companies. 
Keywords: Family Business, intergenerational succession, synthetic control method, capital market reaction 
 
1. Introduction  
The Chinese economy has seen a rapid growth for 
more than 30 years. Family businesses or more 
extensive private enterprises undoubtedly constitute 
an indispensable driving force to China’s economic 
development. At present, Chinese family businesses1 
are in a situation whereby it is time for the founders 
to pass on the businesses to the second generation. 
How does intergenerational succession2 affect the 
company’s stock price? The solution to this problem 
will help family businesses grow smoothly and 
continuously. Most of the existing research focuses 
on the founder characteristics (Davis and Harveston, 
1999), successor selection (Benededsen et al., 2007; 
Cucculelli and Micucci 2008), the change in the 
company’s medium and long-term business 
performance after the succession etc. (Smith and 
Amoakoadu 1999; Villalonga and Amit 2006; 
Bennedsen et al. 2015). There are few researchers 
focusing on the impact of intergenerational 
succession on the stock price of listed companies. The 
closest study is written by Smith and Amoakoadu 
(1999). They used the event research method to study 
124 family-owned companies in Canada, but the 
study has a shortcoming of endogenous treatment. In 
 
1 According to the definition in the ‘China Modern Family 
Business Survey Report’ published by Forbes in 2016, the family 
business is owned or controlled by the family, and at least two or 
more family members are actually involved in the management of 
the business. 
our article, we use the regression synthesis method to 
further alleviate endogeneity problems, and select 
Chinese listed family companies as research sample 
to explore the causal effect of intergenerational 
succession on stock price. The operation of family 
businesses is highly dependent on the family’s 
special assets (Nooteboom 1993; Castanias and 
Helfat 1991), such as the knowledge, skills, 
reputation, political connections, and social 
relationships acquired by the founders through 
managing family businesses for a long time 
(Nooteboom 1993; Fan, Wong, and Zhang: 2012). In 
the process of intergenerational succession, the 
performance of the companies often deteriorated, and 
the stock price fell due to an inability to pass down 
the founder’s special assets (Bennedsen et al., 2007), 
the lack of management experience of the successors 
(Caselli and Gennaioli 2013), etc. Therefore, we 
make the hypothesis that intergenerational succession 
will negatively affect stock price 
2 The establishment and development of Chinese private 
enterprises mainly began in the reform and opening up in the 
early 1980s. It is currently in the peak period from the founder 
generation to the second generation of the family companies. All 
the samples in this article are based on the second-generation 
succession (not the third generations or more). 
II. Data and methodology
Data
According to the ‘China Modern Family Business
Survey Report’ published by Forbes in 2016, it was
pointed out that there are 912 companies on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets that are
family-owned enterprises, of which 79 have success-
fully realized intergenerational succession. The 79
companies were further filtered to exclude compa-
nies that had the following characteristics. First,
companies which were suspended when the second
generation took over were excluded. Second, com-
panies which faced other major events during the
period were also excluded. Therefore, from the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, a total of 42
family businesses are chosen to be part of the
research samples.
Methodology
If we regard the succession as a natural experiment,
then the 42 listed family companies constitute the
treatment group of this experiment and other simi-
lar enterprises in the industry of each family com-
pany constitute the control group. We select 20
trading days3 before and after the succession date
as our estimation window. Comparing the stock
closing price difference between the treatment
group and the control group after the succession,
we can estimate the impact of the intergeneration
succession on the stock price.
In terms of the selection of an estimation method,
considering the characteristics of this research’s
objective and the arbitrariness of the control group
selection in classic DID method in policy interven-
tion which results in biased estimation results, we
have instead decided to use the regression synthetic
control method to estimate the results. This method
is a new synthesis method proposed by Hsiao, Steve
Ching, and Ki Wan (2012) on the basis of the syn-
thetic control method proposed by Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), and uses
a linear combination of control group individuals
to form the counterfactual results of treatment
group individuals after the event. The method pro-
posed by Hsiao, Steve Ching, and Ki Wan (2012) is
directed to estimate the average treatment effect with
only one treatment group. However, there are as
many as 42 treatment groups in this study.
Therefore, we draw on the method from
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Kermani et al. (2016) to
weight average treatment effects in the case of multi-
ple treatment groups and obtain the final treatment
effect. Specifically, if Yjt is the actual closing price of





Where Ŷit is the counterfactual estimate of the treat-
ment group individual i after regression synthesis by
the control group individual, and ωij is the weight of
the jth control group individual for the treatment
group individuali. We use the equation below as
a measure of the goodness of fit before the event
where t only contains periods before the event.
σ̂i ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiP





The equation can be used to weight the treatment
effects of all treatment group individuals. Thus, if we
let SumSigma ¼ P
i
1=σ̂i, and let time be as at the
event occurrence date, the real rate of return for
a period of 20 days after the event occurs is
yieldi;20 ¼ lnYi;timeþ20  lnYi;time, and the counterfac-
tual rate of return is dyieldi;20 ¼ lnŶi;timeþ20  lnŶi;time.
Therefore, the total 20-day average treatment effect









According to the algorithm of Hsiao, Steve Ching,
and Ki Wan (2012), using the closing prices of the
3Our estimation window is larger than that used by Smith and Amoakoadu (1999) because the Chinese stock market adopts price limit system that limits
a daily 10% increase and decrease of each stock, thus it cannot fully reflect the impact of the event on the stock price if the estimation window is too
short. Many event studies taking Chinese listed companies as samples choose a 20-day estimation window. In fact, the research conclusion does not
change so much when we adjust the window to 15 and 25 days respectively.
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listed companies as the outcome variable, we con-
ducted regression synthesis estimations for 42
companies in the treatment group separately.
Using R statistical software, we derive the results
of the average treatment effect shown in Table 1.
In Table 1, bσi is calculated according to the
formula (1), and the dimension and closing price
of bσi are the same. We plot the closing price
density distribution of the individuals in the treat-
ment group in Figure 1.
The closing prices of these treatment group
individuals are mostly below 10 Yuan, the mean
is 6.94, and the mean of bσi is 0.052. The relative
error is only 0.75% = 0.052/6.94. In fact, only five
companies with bσi exceeding 0.1 namely, there-
fore, the overall goodness of fit is still acceptable.
The third column in Table 1 is the weight calcu-
lated based on bσi, and the fourth column is
ATEi ¼ yieldi;20  dyieldi;20. In order to obtain the
comprehensive average causal effect, we can use
the formula (2) and the information in Table 1 to
calculate its value of −8.30%. This article focuses on
the stock price reaction to the intergenerational suc-
cession of listed family companies. It can be seen
from the results that the average share price of listed
companies decreases by −8.3% compared with the
control group, thus the hypothesis is verified.
To see this further, we plot the weighted aver-
age real price trend and the counterfactual price
trend in Figure 2, with the weights in Table 1. The
vertical line in the figure is the succession
announcement date. It can be seen from the
graph that, through the regression synthesis, the
price trends of the two groups are very close
before the announcement of the succession. After
the announcement of the succession, the counter-
factual price trend gradually rises and expands
with time. This means that the stock price trend
should have been the shape of the dotted line in
Figure 2 if there is no intergenerational succes-
sion, but the fact is the stock price trend is the
solid, which means that the stock price has
dropped significantly after the intergenerational
succession.
To obtain the confidence interval of the test
result, we carry out a placebo test according to
the recommendation of Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Kermani et al. (2016). We obtain 1000 fake aver-
age causal effects by repeating the above process
1000 times., and then summarize several key per-
centiles of the 1000 fake average causal effects as
shown in Table 2.
As can be seen from Table 2, the two-sided test
is significant at the 10% significance level, with the
p-value of approximately 0.052. This shows the
empirical test results that the share price of listed
family business decline by −8.3% can pass the
significance test.
Table 1. Average treatment effect estimates.
Code of Company bσi Weight ATEi Code of Company bσi Weight ATEi
000007 0.07 0.00 0.14 002337 0.00 0.24 −0.11
000403 0.04 0.01 −0.03 002422 0.03 0.01 −0.06
000639 0.11 0.00 0.03 002447 0.17 0.00 −0.21
000700 0.04 0.01 0.24 002526 0.00 0.09 −0.30
000726 0.03 0.01 −0.27 002555 0.01 0.02 −0.07
000876 0.06 0.01 −0.04 002633 0.12 0.00 0.09
000929 0.05 0.01 −0.04 300,004 0.40 0.00 0.21
002023 0.08 0.00 −0.03 600,086 0.03 0.01 −0.02
002050 0.03 0.01 −0.06 600,172 0.01 0.06 0.05
002070 0.02 0.02 −0.13 600,257 0.02 0.02 −0.14
002082 0.05 0.01 −0.08 600,295 0.18 0.00 0.11
002099 0.03 0.01 0.09 600,352 0.03 0.01 0.22
002133 0.03 0.01 0.02 600,400 0.01 0.03 −0.07
002216 0.07 0.00 0.02 600,422 0.01 0.05 −0.04
002221 0.01 0.02 0.12 600,527 0.05 0.01 −0.31
002263 0.01 0.03 −0.08 600,535 0.06 0.01 −0.25
002269 0.02 0.02 0.39 600,732 0.00 0.13 −0.21
002284 0.01 0.02 −0.13 600,777 0.02 0.01 −0.01
002328 0.04 0.01 0.07 600,869 0.03 0.01 −0.22
002330 0.10 0.00 0.85 600,966 0.01 0.02 −0.01
002335 0.01 0.03 0.10 600,986 0.08 0.00 −0.15
Codes of company represent company names. bσ i is the measure of fitting effect before the occurrence of the event. The smaller it is, the better the fit. The
weights are calculated from bσi and used to weight the treatment effects of all treatment group individuals. ATEi represents the total 20-day average
treatment effect.
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Robustness test
In order to further investigate the robustness of
the results, we use the difference-in-differences
estimation, that is, we use the treatment group
and control group obtained above, and the event
occurrence date, to construct the following panel
data fixed effect model.
priceit ¼ β0 þ β1TtDi þ λt þ μi þ εit
Here, we control the time and fixed effects
λt; μi, where priceit is the closing price, Tt is the
dummy variable of the event occurrence time, and
Figure 1. Stock price density distribution of the treatment group individuals.
Figure 2. Weighted average real price trend and counterfactual price chart.
The solid line on the upper right side of the figure indicates the real stock prices after the succession, and the dotted line indicates the counterfactual stock
prices derived from the synthetic control method. It can be seen from the figure that the element of intergeneration succession has a significant negative
effect on stock prices after the next generation takes over. The longer the time, the more significant the negative effect.
Table 2. Percentile of Pseudo-average causal effect.
0.5% 2.5% 5% 95% 97.5% 99.5%
Percentile −0.0872 −0.0834 −0.0822 0.111 0.1756 0.1756
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Di is the treatment group dummy variable. Tt ¼ 0
when it is before the occurrence of the succession,
and Tt ¼ 1 when it is after the occurrence of the
succession. Di ¼ 1represents that the company has
undergone intergeneration succession, and Di ¼ 0
represents that the company has not undergone
intergeneration succession. Using time and indi-
vidual double fixed effect model to estimate, we
obtained the results in Table 3. It can be seen that
the difference-in-difference estimate of
the second-generation succession has an average
causal effect of −0.14 Yuan and it is statistically
significant. This supports our hypothesis, that is,
intergenerational succession will decrease the
stock price on average.
Mechanism analysis
The operation of the family business is highly
dependent on the family’s special assets. During
the intergenerational succession, the stock price
fell because the previous generations’ special assets
cannot be effectively passed down. Generally
speaking, the younger the successor, the less spe-
cial assets such as social relations and manage-
ment experience, thus the company’s share price
has fallen even more. In order to prove this
hypothesis, we calculate the causal effect of inter-
generational succession on stock prices by group-
ing the ages when successors take over. The
empirical result shows that the share prices fall
by 10.18% when the successors are less than
30 years old, exceeding the average share price
decrease of 8.3%, but the stock price only fell by
1% when the successors are older than 40.
IV. Conclusion
This article uses the regression synthesis control
method to investigate the impact of the inter-
generation succession on the stock price. It is
found that, overall, the succession will have
a cumulative negative impact of −8.30% on the
stock price within 20 days after the event. At the
same time, the empirical result of the causal
effect grouping by age indicates that the inability
of effectively passing down previous generations’
special assets is the main cause of stock price
decline.
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